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Abstract    The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005 (UCPD) attempts to achieve a 
full harmonisation of the rules against unfair business-to-consumer (B2C) practices. 
However, this paper argues that the UCPD cannot resolve disparities in national laws because 
of a lack of clarity of concepts and the existence of uncertain substantive and enforcement 
provisions. This is demonstrated by the Ferguson v British Gas case which extended the 
loosely formulated UK Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA) to B2C harassment 
cases covered by the UCPD. Ferguson highlights contradictions in the approaches of the two 
systems which suggest loopholes in the UCPD’s full harmonisation goal. As well as 
proposing the amendment of the PHA, the paper suggests that complete harmonisation 
requires that issues of clarity of concepts, definitions, liability, ancillary tort claims and 
enforcement rights which create room for creative interpretations and lack of uniformity 
should be addressed. A one-stop legislation approach to transposition can also improve 
harmonisation. 
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Introduction 
 
A review of the EC Consumer Law Compendium and Database has revealed disparities in 
national laws in areas covered by consumer protection directives for reasons including the 
use of minimum harmonisation directives, the existence of enforcement and other gaps, and 
ambiguities and lack of clarity of concepts (Schulte-Nȍ lke et al. 2008, pp.497-504).  
Consequently, the current EU policy strategy favours full harmonisation directives (CEC 
2002; 2006). This policy has been reflected in the proposed Directive on Consumer Rights 
(CEC 2008) and the Unfair Commercial Practices (UCPD).
1
 The UCPD is a full 
harmonisation directive (Recitals 5, 14, 15, 17, Article 3(5)) designed to establish a single 
regulatory framework to tackle disparities in national laws and prevent legal uncertainties in 
unfair business-to-consumer (B2C) rules which can create barriers and increase the costs of 
transactions (Recitals 3, 4, 5, 12). It marks a departure from the minimum harmonisation 
approach which would have allowed member states to adopt stricter or more protective rules 
(Twigg-Flesner 2010, 355-356).  
There were objections to the maximum harmonisation policy during the drafting of 
the UCPD (Collins 2005, pp.429-432, 2010, 95, 96). With a few exceptions (for example, 
Hondius 2010) commentators have been largely critical of maximum harmonisation with 
some suggesting targeted harmonisation directives instead (Ackermann 2010; Faure 2008; 
Micklitz and Reich 2009; Reich 2005; Rott and Terryn 2009; Twigg-Flesner 2010; 
Wilhelmsson 2008). Some scholars have also questioned the effectiveness of using directives 
in consumer protection. Reich (2005) and Twigg-Flesner (2010) for example, prefer 
regulations because the essential nature of directives which requires national transposition 
exacerbates disparities and promotes inconsistent national laws and incoherent applications. 
However, it is important to examine the pioneering role of the UCPD in order to assess 
whether the Commission’s new approach actually succeeds in removing disparities in 
national law.  
                                                          
1
 Directive 2005/29/EC concerning business-to-consumer commercial practices in the 
internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directive 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC 
and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ 2005 L.149/22 (UCPD). 
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 In accordance with Article 249 EC, the UCPD as a directive is binding only as to the 
result to be achieved. As a basic principle of EU law is that directives have no horizontal 
direct effect,
2
 the UCPD need to be implemented by transposition into national law and 
parties cannot rely directly on it. Transposition is a process that targets results to be achieved 
and does not impose concepts, terminologies and methods on national authorities.
3
 Unlike 
minimum harmonisation directives which introduce minimum levels of protection beyond 
which national transposition can include more stringent provisions, the UCPD as a full 
harmonisation directive establishes an upper ceiling. However, Member States are permitted 
for a period of six years from the 12 June 2007 effective implementation date to maintain 
existing national provisions which implemented other directives more restrictive or 
prescriptive than the UCPD (Article 3(5)). The UK which initially opposed the draft UCPD 
(DTI 2002; Collins 2004, p.1) implemented it through the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/1277) (CPUTR) which came into force on 26 May 2008.
4
  
 Settled EU law demonstrates that although legislation may not be necessary for 
implementing directives, full and effective application by national authorities and preciseness 
and clarity of legal position in national law are required.
5
 In Enka,
6
 the ECJ held that despite 
member states’ discretion as to the method of implementing directives, a directive that targets 
uniform application could require “absolute identity” and “identical application” of its 
provisions. The CPUTR are likely to pass the test since they are almost a wholesale adoption 
                                                          
2
 Faccini Dori v Recreb SRL C-91/92 [1994] ECR I-3325; El Corte Ingles SA v Rivero C-
192/94 [1996] ECR I-1281. 
3
 Commission v Germany Case C-59/89 [1991] ECR I-2607, para.18; Case 363/85 
Commission v Italy [1987] 1733. 
4
 The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (SI 2008 1277) 
implementing Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market 2005 L149/22, SI 2008/1277 in force on 26 May 2008. 
5
 Commission v Germany Case 29/84 [1985] ECR 1661, para.23; Commission v Greece Case 
C-365/93 [1995] ECR I-449, para.9; Commission v The Netherlands Case C-144/99 [2001] 
ECR I-3541, para.17. 
6
  Enka BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen Arnhem Case 38/77 [1977] ECR 
2203, paras.11-18.  
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of the substantive provisions of the UCPD. There are, however, differences in the detailed 
provisions in the CPUTR for criminal sanctions and enforcement. Although the UCPD does 
not contain detailed enforcement provisions, it suggests room for broad enforcement rights 
and powers including injunctions and civil and criminal penalties (Recital 22, Articles 11, 
13), an approach largely reflected in the CPUTR (Regulations 8-24). 
 Nevertheless, transposition can include modifying existing national laws for 
consistency with a directive but a Member State can refrain from taking further actions 
towards transposition if existing national law which is not inconsistent with the directive can 
achieve the results intended (Schulte-Nȍ lke et al. 2008).The CPUTR therefore repealed 12 
laws and amended 11 other consumer-related legislation in order to comply with the UCPD’s 
maximum harmonisation principle (DTI 2005a, 2006a; OFT/BERR 2008). For example, 
section 40 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 was amended to remove business-to-
consumer (B2C) practices from of its offence of unlawful harassment of debtors (DTI 2006a, 
p.63; DTI 2006b, pp.9, 10; Twigg-Flesner et al. 2005, pp.62-66). However, the untouched 
harassment provisions in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA) which have been 
applied in the Ferguson v British Gas
7
 can create obstacles to harmonisation in B2C practices 
including advertising and marketing, consumer credit, debt collection, and the enforcement 
and termination of agreements (OFT 2006, paras.2.5-2.6). 
 This paper therefore takes a fresh look at the harmonisation goal of the UCPD, 
particularly its pledge in Article 1 of the approximation of national laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions and its assurance in Recital 12 that “consumers and business will be 
able to rely on a single regulatory framework based on clearly defined legal concepts 
regulating all aspects of unfair commercial practices across the EU.” The aims of the paper 
are therefore twofold: firstly, to shed new light on the effectiveness of the full harmonisation 
policy and, secondly, to examine whether the UK transposition ensures consistency and 
coherence of implementation and application of the UCPD. The paper proceeds on the basis 
that the extent of harmonisation is determined by the content of a directive. It does not 
examine whether regulations should replace directives as consumer protection tools (Reich 
2005; Twigg-Flesner 2010) or the merits of full harmonisation (Howells 2002; 2007; Howells 
and Wilhelmsson 2003; Karsten and Sinai 2003; Stuyck et al. 2006, pp.115-117; Twigg-
Flesner and Parry 2007, pp.216-220; Van den Bergh 2002; Wilhelmsson 2002).  While it 
focuses on the prohibition of harassment (Articles 8, 9, Annex 1 items 24-31) this paper, 
                                                          
7
 Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd [2010] 1 WLR 785 (CA). 
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however, argues that there are difficult issues of clarity of concepts, definitions, liability, 
ancillary tort claims, and enforcement rights that could defeat the UCPD’s total 
harmonisation goal. These issues have created room for Ferguson which exploited sloppy 
legislative drafting in the PHA. 
 
Legislating against Harassment- UCPD and Full Harmonisation 
 
The UCPD is a fairly more comprehensive directive than prior consumer protection directives 
which targeted specific matters (Howells et al. 2006; Stuyck et al. 2006, pp.109-112). The 
overall purpose of the UCPD which is to protect the “average consumer’s” (Article 5(2)(3)) 
economic interest (Articles 1, 2(e), 5(3)) reflects a combined objective and economic test that 
does not ordinarily protect consumers from mere distress or discomfort. It contains a broad 
definition of “commercial practice” which includes conduct before, during and after contracts 
(Article 3(1)). Article 2(d) defines B2C commercial practice as “any act, omission, course of 
conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, 
by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers.” 
As the European Court of Justice (ECJ) recognises, this provision is “a particularly wide 
definition of the concept of commercial practices.”8 The wide definition is supported by a 
three-fold scheme of a general clause, two sets of specific clauses and an exhaustive blacklist. 
 First is the general prohibition by Article 5(1) of unfair commercial practices. Article 
5(2) explains that a commercial practice is unfair “if: it is contrary to the requirements of 
professional diligence, and it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic 
behaviour with regard to the product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it 
is addressed, or of the average member of the group when a commercial practice is directed 
to a particular group of consumers.” This two-fold test is a balancing mechanism that screens 
out mere distress or anxiety. Therefore a conduct which affects the economic behaviour of 
consumers as is ordinarily expected of businesses is not unfair if it meets the professional 
diligence standard. By Article 2(h) professional diligence is the exercise of a reasonable 
standard of “special skill and care” which is commensurate with honesty market practices and 
good faith. This suggests an objective test similar to the English system’s “reasonable skill 
and care” (OFT/BERR 2008; Twigg-Flesner et al. 2005). Article 2(e) indicates that material 
                                                          
8
 Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus arenhandelsgesellschaft mbH 
Case C-304/08, 14 January 2010, para.36. 
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distortion of consumers’ economic behaviour is the impairment of their ability to make 
informed decisions making consumers to take transactional decisions they would not have 
taken. Although the European Commission Staff Working Document has indicated that 
“transactional decision” includes both decisions to purchase or refrain from making 
purchasing decisions (CEC 2009), the doubts created about the scope of the expression 
(Howells 2007) could have been cleared in the UCPD itself.  
 Secondly, there is a more detailed and specific prohibition of misleading actions 
(Article 6), misleading omissions (Article 7), and aggressive practices (Article 8), if they 
satisfy the “transactional decision” condition in Article 5(2). Thirdly, Annex 1 contains a 
blacklist of 31 practices which are in all circumstances automatically considered unfair 
(Article 5(5)) and do not require the “transactional decision” condition. This list of high 
pressure selling practices some which have been prohibited by previous directives may 
appear not to be very useful because of the catch-all nature of the general and specific 
prohibitions. It may be, however, a clearer pointer to the legislative intention.  The 
prohibitions echo the debate as to whether mandatory information requirement or outright 
compulsion/prohibition of particular conduct is the appropriate regulatory technique for 
consumer protection (Grundmann et al. 2002; Hadfield et al. 1998; Howells 2005; Howells 
and Wilhelmsson 1998; 2003; Weatherill 1994; 2005, pp.84-115; Wilhelmsson 2004).  
Although it suggests the objective of regulating information for informed consumer consent, 
the UCPD also adopts the second regulatory technique by prohibiting practices which could 
impair consumers’ freedom of choice (Recital 16, Article 2(e)).   
 One of such prohibited practices is harassment as part of the broader concept of 
aggressive practices which is the focus of this paper. The relevant UCPD provisions on 
aggressive practices (Articles 8, 9, Annex 1) are closely followed by the CPUTR (Regulation 
7, Schedule 1 items 24 to 31). Aggressive practices are a relatively new area in EU consumer 
protection (Recital 11) (Howells 2006, p.170), although anecdotal and empirical evidence, for 
example, shows that “harassment” is a growing but not a particularly recent phenomenon. 
The UK, for example, has witnessed explosions in “vigorous advertising” of consumer credit 
services (Griffiths, 2006, p.75), debt
9
 and litigation (Howells, 2010). Creditors usually prefer 
other means to legal actions and formal debt collection procedures which they consider 
expensive and slow particularly in relation to the size of consumer debts (Bertola et al. 2006). 
                                                          
9
 http://www.creditaction.org.uk/helpful-resources/debt-statistics.html (accessed 4 April 
2011). 
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The UCPD therefore attempts to fill a gap in the law’s protective screen against aggressive 
practices. 
 A key provision is Article 8 which prohibits aggressive practices which through 
harassment, coercion, or undue influence significantly impair or are likely to significantly 
impair the average consumer’s freedom of choice and distort their transactional decisions. 
Undue influence is defined, but the UCPD lacks definitions of actionable harassment and its 
lower and upper thresholds (Article 2(j)) despite the fact that harassment is a concept that 
means different things to different people and includes a wide range of feelings. A definition 
of harassment is required to delimit its outer boundaries, provide sufficient guidance for the 
courts, and discourage any uncertainty that could be exploited.  It may be true that 
inexactness of definition “allows the law sufficient ‘wiggle room’ to effectuate...remedial 
ends” (Partlett, 1997, p.192), and that both the de minimis rule in tort law10 and the 
materiality test in the UCPD (Recital 6, Article 2(e)) can exclude trivial claims, but Article 8 
is an open-ended invitation to all manner of claims. It does not consider the interests of 
businesses which the UCPD also attempts to protect (Recital 8). 
 Nevertheless Article 9 indicates some relevant factors for determining the occurrence 
of harassment. The factors under include time, location, nature or persistence, the use of 
threatening or abusive language or behavior, the exploitation by the trader of any specific 
misfortune or circumstance, onerous or disproportionate non-contractual barriers imposed by 
the trader, and any threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken. This list confirms the 
combined reasonableness and materiality test which suggests a seriousness threshold for 
traders’ actions and consumers’ responses (Recital 6, Article 9(a)). These vague non-
exhaustive factors may be helpful indicators but it is not clear what weight they should be 
given or whether they are viewed from the consumer or trader’s perspective. In comparison, 
practices in the blacklist in Annex 1 are clearly unfair irrespective of their effect on 
consumers’ economic interests and decisions (Article 5(5)).  
 Compared to minimum harmonisation directives (Dougan, 2000), the UCPD does not 
permit a greater or a more restrictive level of consumer protection than its provisions except 
in financial services and immovable property matters (Recital 15, Article 3(9)).  As the 
UCPD excludes national “legislative experimenting” (Stuyck et al. 2006, p.117) it protects 
                                                          
10
 De minimis non curat lex (The law is not concerned with trifles), recently restated in 
Grieves v Everard & Sons Ltd [2008] 1 AC 281, 307 para.73 (Lord Scott); Ferguson v British 
Gas, above n 7, 791E (Jacobs LJ). 
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consumers as well as traders by ensuring certainty and uniformity of rules (Recitals 4, 8, 17). 
National laws must not be “overly protective of consumers” in matters regulated by the 
UCPD (Collins 2010, p.117). The scheme indicates that “consumers are entitled to no less, 
but also to no more, than the UCPD provides” since “the consumer will get what (the UCPD) 
decides that she or he deserves – no less, but certainly no more” (Stuyck et al. 2006, pp.116, 
134).  In other words, consumers are not protected from every “unfair” commercial practice 
including those prohibited by previous or existing national rules but not under the UCPD 
(Karsten and Sinai 2003, p.165).  
Early indications of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisprudence suggest the 
confirmation of full harmonisation in matters within the UCPD’s competence (Glockner 
2010, pp.575-584).  The court has held that the UCPD affected pre-existing national law and 
consequently precluded a Belgian prohibition of combined offers regarded as commercial 
practices under the UCPD,
11
  a position it recently confirmed in two decisions.
12
 The three 
decisions are consistent with the court’s view on the Product Liability Directive,13 an earlier 
directive that adopted a “complete harmonisation” strategy which prevented Member States 
from establishing or maintaining favourable or stricter rules than its provisions.
14
  Similarly 
in Cordero Alonso,
15
 the court held that Directive 2002/74
16
 required specific transposition 
into national law and precluded inconsistent existing national rules. Therefore the 
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 VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV and Galatea BVBA v Sanoma Magazines Belgium NV, 
Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07, 23 April 2009, OJ C 141, 20/06/2009 3-4, paras. 35, 
67. 
12
 Zentrale  v Plus, above n 8, paras.35-54; Telekommunikacja Polska SA w Warszawie v 
Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej Case C-522/08, 11 March 2010, para.31. 
13
 Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products OJ 
1985  L.210  29.  
14
 María Victoria González Sánchez v Medicina Asturiana SA Case C-183/00 [2002] ECR I-
3901, paras.21-34. 
15
 Anacleto Cordero Alonso v Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogasa) Case C-81/05 [2006] 
ECR I-7569, para.29. 
16
 Directive 2002/74/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 
2002 amending Directive 80/987/EEC OJ 2002 L.270 10. 
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compatibility of the unmodified PHA harassment provisions with the UCPD is considered 
next. 
 
Legislating against Harassment: the PHA, Then and Now  
 
The PHA prohibits a course of conduct which, with the harasser’s actual or constructive 
knowledge, amounts to harassment (section 1(1).  This provision follows the traditional 
English law’s focus on victims’ responses and impact of events (Law Commission 1998, 
para.5.33; Tennant 2002, p.74), but it is not clear whether it concerns initial responses and 
acute sources only rather than chronic causes of harassment. The PHA’s notion of harassment 
is, however, significantly different from the UCPD’s professional diligence and materiality 
test which does not include knowledge (Article 5(2)). Although constructive knowledge in 
the PHA suggests an objective standard as professional diligence requires, knowledge is 
relevant in the UCPD only when transactions involves who are vulnerable because of their 
mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity (Article 5(3)).  
Section 7(2) defines harassment as including “alarming the person or causing the person 
distress.” Apart from contradicting the seriousness test in the UCPD, this definition is not 
very helpful because “harassment, alarm or distress” can be alternative pointers with different 
meanings.
17
 It is also a low threshold suggesting that it can capture ordinary states of 
“annoyance or worry”18 particularly because distress is merely an “emotional disturbance or 
upset”.19 In fact under the PHA it “might be harassment even if no alarm or distress were in 
fact caused.”20 The difficulty is that emotional injury contains a wide range of conditions 
varying in severity and duration (Law Commission 1998, pp.8-54).
21
 Within this sphere, 
harassment, like “pain and suffering,” denotes a range of feelings (Law Commission 1995, 
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 Southard v DPP [2006] EWHC 3449, para.16 (Fulford, J.). 
18
 DPP v Ramsdale [2001] EWHC Admin 106, para.16. 
19
 R (on the application of R) v. DPP [2006] EWHC 1375 (Admin). 
20
 Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2007] 1 AC 224 (HL), para.46 (Baroness 
Hale of Richmond). 
21
 New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services v G (J) [1999] 3 SCR 46, 58-
60 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
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para.2.10) including distress and anxiety at the lower end. It is not a surprise that the courts 
have failed to arrive at a definition of harassment, and without a clear legislative guide they 
could only offer unhelpful divergent tests (Patten 2010). However, by merely indicating that 
harassment involves conduct that goes beyond the unpleasant
22
  the courts permit UCPD B2C 
harassment cases to be brought under the PHA without requiring materiality, a situation 
which as Diagram 1 clearly demonstrates does not promote uniformity of concepts and law. 
Section 7(3) declares that “a course of conduct” resulting in harassment requires at least 
two occurrences. In Sunderland v Conn,
23
 the court held that one incident is insufficient 
because section 7(3) requires at least two incidents which, standing alone, also constitute 
harassment. To constitute a course of conduct, incidents must have sufficient proximity in 
time, place and circumstances.
24
 The PHA and the UCPD may coincide here since both 
“course of conduct” and “practice” suggest a pattern of behaviour. However, in requiring at 
least two incidents the PHA may be clearer than the mere indication of “persistence” as a 
relevant factor (Article 9(a)). Another uncontroversial provision is section 7(4) which 
indicates that harassment including speech is likely to cover face-to-face and telephone 
statements. Implicit also are statements made, generated or disseminated in any written form. 
The UCPD suggests a similar effect since it does not restrict the form of “threatening or 
abusive language or behaviour” (Article 9(b)). 
Defences under the PHA include proof that the conduct was reasonable even if 
harassment had resulted (section 1(3)(c)), the prevention and detection of crime, and acting 
under or in compliance with a law (section 1(3)(a)(b)).
25
 Section 12 excludes actions certified 
                                                          
22
 See Sunderland City Council v Conn [2007] EWCA Civ. 1492, [2008] IRLR 324, paras.11-
12 (Gage LJ); Majrowski v Guy’s, above n 20, para.30 (Lord Nicholls), para.46 (Baroness 
Hale); Wainright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406, 426 (Lord Hoffmann); Allen v Southwark 
London Borough Council [2008] EWCA Civ. 1478 (Longmore LJ); Ferguson v British Gas, 
above n 7, 791E-H (Jacob LJ); Thomas v News Group Newspapers [2001] EWCA Civ. 1233 
(CA); Veakins v Kier Islington Ltd [2009] WLR (D) 353, [2010] IRLR 132 (CA); S&D 
Property Investments Ltd v Nisbet [2009] EWHC 1726 (Ch). 
23
 Sunderland City Council v Conn, above n 22. See also Wainright v Home Office, above n 
22, 426 (Lord Hoffmann). 
24
 Marinello v Edinburgh City Council [2010] SLT 349, [2010] IRLR 778 (Court of Session). 
25
 See EDO MBM Technology Ltd v Axworthy [2005] EWHC 2490 (QB); Dowson v Chief 
Constable of Northumbria [2010] EWHC 2612 (QB). 
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by the Secretary of State to concern national security, national economic well-being, and the 
prevention and detection of serious crime. These defences show that harassment occurs only 
when “a reasonable man normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with 
stress engendered.”26 Their objective standard seems compatible with the UCPD’s 
professional diligence although the details diverge.
27
   
Section 2 makes harassment a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment, financial 
penalty or both, while section 5 provides that the court can grant restraining orders against 
persons convicted of the offence.  Section 3 permits victims of harassment to take civil 
actions. Civil remedies available include damages and injunctive relief while recoverable 
damages are for anxiety and financial and other losses. These provisions recognise that civil 
and criminal laws can coincide in harassment and to that extent are likely to be compatible 
with the UCPD which has left national laws to decide the nature of penalties (Article 13). 
Although criminalisation is not expressly permitted, nothing in UCPD suggests a restriction 
of Member States’ ability to impose criminal sanctions for unfair commercial practices 
(Stuyck et al. 2006, p.136).  Consequently the CPUTR criminalises unfair commercial 
practices knowingly or recklessly undertaken (Regulation 8), and creates strict liability 
criminal offences for misleading actions, misleading omissions, aggressive practices and the 
practices in the blacklist (Regulations 9, 10, 11 and 12).  
 
                                                          
26
 Molien v Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 616 P 2d 813, 819-820 (Cal. 1980). 
27
 UCPD, Articles 2(h), 5(2), 5(3); CPUTR, Regulations 17, 18; Ferguson v British Gas, 
above n 7, 796C-E (Jacob LJ), 798G-H (Lloyd LJ); R v C (Sean Peter) [2001] EWCA Crim 
1251 (CA). 
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Diagram 1: Harassment regulation in the UCPD and the PHA 
 
The PHA which was originally intended to provide preventative and protective remedies 
against stalking (Fenwick, 2007, p.870) has been, however, applied to other situations. The 
key case is Majrowski
28 
in which the House of Lords confirmed that the tort of harassment in 
the PHA has a broader scope than stalking. Consequently, the PHA has been used, for 
example, against a series of newspaper publications,
29
   and applied in workplace situations,
30
 
landlord and tenant matters,
31
 and disputes between local authorities and residents.
32
 It has 
been used to confront repeated legal proceedings,
33
 tackle insistent and importunate police 
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 Majrowski v Guy’s, above n 20. 
29
 Thomas v News Group Newspapers, above n 22. 
30
 Majrowski v Guy’s, above n 20; Sunderland City Council v Conn, above n 22; Hammond v 
International Network Services UK Ltd [2007] EWHC 2604 (QB); Veakins v Kier Islington, 
above n 22; Dowson v Chief Constable, above n 25; Rayment v Ministry of Defence [2010] 
EWHC 218 (QB). 
31
 Allen v Southwark, above n 22. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid. 
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questioning,
34
 and protect employees of a medical research organization from animal rights 
activists.
35
 The difficulty, however, is that the outer boundaries of the statutory tort are not 
evident from either the PHA or Majrowski which both predated the UCPD and did not 
consider the compatibility issues in the two sets of B2C harassment rules. It was not until 
Ferguson that the PHA was applied to a B2C case. Ferguson which is considered next 
highlights the dangers posed by the PHA to the full harmonisation goal of the UCPD.  
 
 PHA and Ferguson - Distorting Full Harmonisation 
 
In Ferguson, the claimant who was a customer of British Gas validly terminated a utility 
supply contract and immediately contracted with another provider.  However for a period of 
at least five months, British Gas sent the claimant a series of bills and letters threatening to 
cut off her gas supply, commence legal proceedings against her, and report her to credit 
rating agencies. The claimant was troubled and, being a businesswoman, her anxiety was 
aggravated by the threatened reports to credit rating agencies. As credit agencies collect, 
store, analyze and make available to lenders information on consumers (Ferretti 2010:3-5), 
the claimant’s anxiety was probably justified. British Gas ignored the claimant’s several 
letters and telephone calls, even sent her further bills and threat letters, and failed to reply her 
solicitor’s letter. The claimant could not bring a contractual claim since the contract had been 
terminated. Moreover, contract law does not recognise injury to feelings except in very 
limited circumstances.
36
 Also motivated by public interest-related concerns about treatment 
of customers,
37
 the claimant claimed harassment under the PHA for “considerable anxiety.”38 
This meets the low threshold of the PHA but it is doubtful whether it is sufficient for a claim 
                                                          
34
 KD v Chief Constable of Hampshire [2005] EWHC 2550 (QB). 
35
 Daiichi v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty [2004] 1 WLR 1503 (QB). 
36
 Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd [1973] QB 233 (CA); Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 
WLR 1468 (CA); Heywood v Wellers [1976] QB 466 (CA);  Cox v Philips Industries Ltd 
[1976] 1 WLR 638, 644 (Lord Denning MR); Bliss v South East Thames Regional Health 
Authority [1987] ICR 700 (CA); Watts v Morrow [1991] 1 WLR 1421, (Bingham LJ); Farley 
v Skinner [2002] 2 AC 732 (HL). 
37
 Ferguson v British Gas, above n 7, 787H-788B. 
38
 Ibid 787F-G. 
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under the UCPD/CPUTR because the claimant did not allege any material distortion of 
transactional decision. 
 However, British Gas applied for the claim to be struck out for failing to disclose a 
reasonable cause of action under the PHA.  The company argued that no harassment arose 
since the claimant knew the demands were unwarranted; it was not liable for automatic 
computer generated messages because such messages could not be attributed to it; and its 
conduct did not satisfy the gravity criterion for the criminal offence. Both the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal rejected British Gas’ arguments and held that its conduct, if proved, 
could in principle constitute harassment. It was considered significant that the defendant 
threatened to “tell a credit reference agency in the next ten days that [the claimant has] not 
paid”39 but immaterial the claimant knew that the threats were unwarranted.40 It was held 
immaterial that harassment is caused by automatically generated messages, or by the 
deliberate actions of an organization or individuals within that organization.
41
 This decision 
which reflects an anthropomorphic approach that attributes human characteristics to 
corporations is, however, incompatible with the impact and materiality requirements of the 
UCPD (Article 5(2)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 Ibid 792B-C. 
40
 Ibid 791H (Gage LJ). 
41
 Ibid 791H-792C (Jacobs LJ). 
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enforcement 
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Use of non-legal 
enforcement 
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Consumer  
in breach 
PHA can apply 
 
UCPD does not 
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UCPD does not 
apply 
PHA can apply 
 
UCPD will 
probably apply 
PHA can apply 
 
UCPD will 
probably apply 
 
 
Consumer  
not in breach 
PHA can apply 
 
UCPD will 
probably not 
apply 
PHA can apply 
 
UCPD will 
probably not 
apply 
PHA can apply 
 
UCPD can apply 
PHA can apply 
 
UCPD can apply 
Table 1: UCPD and PHA- Contradictions and Inconsistencies 
 
 
Nevertheless Ferguson might have exploited the sloppy definition of harassment in the PHA 
to stretch its boundaries.  The definition which lacks clear guides for distinguishing cases of 
insensitive businesses and oversensitive consumers also fails the materiality test in the 
UCPD. The UCPD and CPUTR
42
 provisions on B2C harassment (OFT/BERR, 2008, pp.40-
43; Willett, 2010a, pp.259-264, 2010b) ought to have been applied because the actions of 
British Gas could, for example, constitute “any threat to take legal action which cannot be 
                                                          
42
 UCPD, Articles 8, 9 and Annex 1 items 24-31; CPUTR, Regulations 3(4)(c)(d), 7, 11, 15 
and Schedule 1 paras.25, 26. 
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taken” (Article 9(e)).43 It is worrying that Ferguson’s model also applies to legally justified 
demands if “illegitimate pressure” is used.44 As Table 1shows, the suggestion that consumers 
who are in breach of their contractual obligations can bring harassment claims contradicts 
Article 9(e).
45
  The UCPD is unlikely to support claims for irritation or for activities 
consumers can simply ignore.  
 The procedural focus of the PHA has wider implications and can open up harassment 
claims for consumer advertising and marketing including direct contacts and automatically 
generated messages, an area directly regulated by the UCPD (Articles 1, 2(k), 5(2), 8, 9(b)). 
It is instructive that although unwanted and automated messages can infringe the Privacy 
Directive
46
 they are unlikely to be unfair under the UCPD (Collins 2010, pp.109-110; 
Howells 2007, p.109; Johnson 2005, p.165).  Unlike the PHA which recognises claims for 
“persistent and unwanted solicitations”47 if distress or alarms results, the UCPD does not 
recognise a stand-alone harassment claim unless it involves the distortion of economic 
interests (Recitals 4, 6, 7). Ferguson’s interpretation of the PHA is therefore an expansive 
scheme for consumer protection which can usurp the UCPD, reach far-flung cases and cause 
unimaginable volume of potential claims. It shows that the PHA distorts the picture of full 
harmonisation and Twigg-Flesner et al. (2005, pp.5, 62-66) and Twigg-Flesner and Parry 
(2007, pp.221-222) were right to hint at potential overlaps and inconsistencies with the 
UCPD although the UK authorities dismissed it (DTI 2005b, p.95).  
 
 
                                                          
43
 CPUTR, Regulation 7(2). 
44
 Ferguson v British Gas, above n 7, 791H (Jacob LJ); S&D Property Investments Ltd v 
Nisbet, above n 22; Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316 (CA). See also Bunyan v Jordan 
(1937) 57 CLR 1 (High Court of Australia). 
45
 CPUTR, Regulation 7(2)(e). 
46
 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 
31.7.2002, 37–47, implemented in the UK by The Privacy and Electronic Communications 
(EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/2426). 
47
 UCPD, Annex 1, item 26 (CPUTR Schedule 1 item 26). 
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Beyond Full Harmonisation 
 
Complete harmonisation excludes competing national laws, particularly legislation that can 
be exploited by creative and generous interpretation as Ferguson and the PHA demonstrate. 
Loosely drafted legislation can bring unforeseen and unwanted results, including turning 
consumers from the hunted to the hunter. An example is the consumer credit litigation which 
saw a significant growth in the UK partly because of the recently amended provision against 
the enforceability of improperly executed credit agreements (Howells 2010). Also, if a 
directive lacks sufficient clarity there may be difficult questions concerning the 
appropriateness of national law and compatibility with full harmonisation. In the UCPD, 
however, are issues of definitions of concepts, scope, attribution, criminalisation, ancillary 
tort claims, and enforcement that need to be addressed to give the complete harmonisation 
goal a chance of success. These issues which constitute practical difficulties for businesses, 
consumers, regulators and enforcement authorities create confusion and ambiguities in 
meanings and a lack of legislative cohesion, and hinder true harmonisation. 
 
Concepts 
 
Uniformity is difficult to achieve if an adequate and overarching definitional structure is not 
in place. Non-imposition of concepts during transposition creates the problem of separate and 
sometimes inconsistent national rules on a subject regulated by a consumer protection 
directive (Roth 2002). In the UK for example, local enforcement authorities because of 
differing operational and cultural factors have different views on the meanings of UCPD 
concepts (Williams and Hare 2010).  The unfamiliarity of concepts which is evident across 
other Member States (Collins 2010; Twigg-Flesner and Parry 2007) has been partly triggered 
by a lack of clarity of concepts used in the UCPD. Apart from the undefined key concept of 
harassment, it is also worth mentioning that matters of “taste and decency” which national 
laws can regulate (Recital 7) suggest a loose legislative language. A generous interpretation 
of “decency” could even suggest the PHA’s compatibility with the UCPD since it targets 
stalking, a matter of decent behaviour.  
 It is possible that consistency of meanings can be achieved if national courts make 
TFEU Article 267 (EC Article 234) references to the ECJ to interpret the UCPD concepts, but 
this is unlikely to resolve the difficulties. Even with the existence of a general doctrine of 
18 
 
autonomous meaning in EU law,
48
 national courts in practice rarely refer concepts in 
consumer protection directives to the ECJ as they would rather prefer interpretations within 
the confines of the national legislation (Loos 2007; Twigg-Flesner 2010). This seems the case 
in the UK where the highest court declined to make references in two high profile cases.
49
  
 
One-stop legislation 
 
Harmonisation can be improved if transposition involves only one set of national law. This 
ensures ease of reference and closer scrutiny of consistency in substantive and enforcement 
provisions. If the UCPD had contained a general statement overriding any other legislation on 
B2C harassment, references to the PHA in such cases will clearly be irrelevant. Nonetheless 
the unresolved question is whether the UCPD is intended as the “catch-all” legislation against 
B2C harassment. Apart from the PHA, there are harassment provisions in the UK Public 
Order Act 1986 which can impede full harmonisation. According to section 5, an offence is 
committed if a person “uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or 
disorderly behaviour; or displays any writing, sign, or other visible representation which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused 
harassment, alarm or distress thereby.” Nothing in the legislation suggests the exclusion of 
B2C harassment from this offence. Therefore a requirement in the UCPD for one set of 
national legislation for B2C harassment might have prevented the intrusion of the PHA and 
the Public Order Act.  
 Similarly, the UCPD does not clarify its relationship with other legislation that may 
have B2C harassment issues, particularly the consumer protection legislation retained under 
Article 3(4). It is not clear whether the UCPD has displaced the harassment provisions in 
such statutes. In consumer credit with its own specific directive and national law (Howells 
2010, p.639) for example, Ferguson’s interpretation of the PHA can apply. For example, if 
unreasonable steps taken to recover debts or serve enforcement notices cause alarm, a claim 
                                                          
48
 Ekro v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees Case 327/82 [1984] ECR 107, para.11; 
Luxembourg v Linster Case C-287/98 [2000] ECR I-6917; Landeshauptsdat Kiel v Jaeger 
Case C-151/02 [2003] ECR I-8389, para.58. 
49
 Director-General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2001] UKHL 52; Office of Fair 
Trading v Abbey National plc [2009] UKSC 6. 
19 
 
under the PHA may be possible. Strangely, neither the PHA nor the UCPD was cited in 
Harrison where the court decided that a lender could not recover because, among other 
reasons, its frequent and untraceable telephone calls harassed the consumer.
 50
  In 
contradiction to the UCPD, it was immaterial that the consumer was indebted to the lender 
nor that the debt was due and the lender could issue recovery proceedings. This triangular 
jurisdictional competition involving the UCPD, the specific (consumer credit) legislation and 
other national law such as the PHA could have been avoided by clearly stipulating the 
applicable legislation. This approach pushes directives towards a single set of rules in 
Member States, a position regulations occupy at the EU level. 
 
Crime and attribution 
 
Criminal sanctions are not unknown to corporations and consumer law (Cartwright 2001; 
2010; Craig 2009; Diskant 2008; Ermann and Lundman 2001; Horder 2002; Leigh 1982), but 
the UCPD’s omission of a requirement or approval of criminal sanctions for B2C harassment 
(Article 13) has created difficulties for its maximum harmonisation objective.  Apart from the 
problem of having two pieces of applicable criminal legislation, when civil and criminal laws 
coincide in an area such as harassment harmonisation of one without addressing its 
implication for the other can be untidy. It does not help that B2C harassment may be a 
criminal offence in one Member State and not in the other, and also that the question of 
criminalisation in consumer protection has not been addressed at the EU level.  
It is a controversial issue even in the UK where many commentators preferred civil 
enforcement to the exclusion of criminal sanctions for the UCPD (DTI 2005b; 2006a; 2006b; 
2007; BERR 2008; Williams and Hare 2010, p.384). However, the CPUTR follows the UK’s 
usual mix of civil and criminal sanctions (DTI 2006b; Cartwright 2007; Hampton 2005; 
Macrory 2006). Although the UK government stressed that criminal sanctions should not be 
the “primary” enforcement mechanism for the UCPD (BERR 2008, para. 100), its meaning 
and practical implications are unclear.  The CPUTR (DTI 2006b; 2007; Collins 2010, pp.111-
112) contains rules for attribution of corporate criminal liability
51
 which could easily be 
avoided by using the PHA even though the PHA lacks equivalent provisions.  
                                                          
50
 Harrison v Link Financial Ltd [2011] EWHC B3 (Mercantile) (28 February 2011), 
paras.52, 53, 56, 78, 83 (Judge Chambers QC).  
51
 CPUTR, Regulations 3(4)(c)(d), 7, 11, 15. 
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 Also, nothing in the UCPD indicates any rules for corporate liability or that the 
CPUTR model is followed by all Member States raising the possibility of divergent national 
attribution rules which defeat the UCPD’s goals of uniformity and certainty. Ferguson52 
demonstrates that parallel criminal offences and civil wrongs in cases involving individuals 
and its transmutation to B2C cases involving corporations with complex organizational and 
other structures are different issues. The UCPD appears to ignore the fact that corporations 
may be legal persons, but they are not exactly like human beings. As a consequence, criminal 
liability is imposed directly on corporations or under the doctrine of vicarious liability for the 
actions or omissions of employees and agents (Pinto and Evans 2003, p.5; Wells 2001, p.30; 
2002, p.291). Like the current UK debates on regulatory offences (Law Commission 2010a), 
an EU-wide debate on criminal sanctions and corporate criminal liability in consumer 
protection is important.  It can clarify the personal and vicarious liabilities of corporations 
including identifying the class of persons whose acts or omissions can be attributed to them 
(Gobert 1994, p.401; Pinto and Evans 2003, p.57).
53
  
 
Enforcement 
 
Article 11 and Recital 21 which constitute an open-ended requirement unrestricted by any 
express indications for enforcement by public bodies and private persons and organizations
54
 
can with other unclear enforcement provisions defeat full harmonisation.  For example, 
Article 3(2) exemption of contract law confirms that contractual enforcement rights are 
unaffected (Whittaker, 2007). While it may be helpful to bind parties to their agreed 
obligations, contractual enforcement rights which differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction can 
create distort harmonisation.  Although Article 3(2) seems to indicate that ancillary tort 
claims are affected since they have not been expressly excluded Recital 9 confirms the 
                                                          
52
 Ferguson v British Gas, above n 7, 789D-792D, 799F. 
53
 See Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 
500; Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153; Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London 
Borough Council [1993] 2 All ER 718. 
54
 See Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero (C-240/98) and Salvat 
Editores SA v José M. Sánchez Alcón Prades (C-241/98), José Luis Copano Badillo (C-
242/98), Mohammed Berroane (C-243/98) and Emilio Viñas Feliú (C-244/98) Joined cases 
C-240/98 to C-244/98 [2000] ECR I-4941, paras.27-29. 
21 
 
availability of personal claims. However, the UCPD does not indicate whether any other 
statutory (as in the PHA) or the common law
55
 (Collins 2010, pp.113-114) personal 
enforcement right is excluded. The CPUTR is similarly silent because consultations are 
ongoing in the UK to determine whether private claims can arise from matters covered by the 
UCPD (Collins 2010, p.115; Law Commission 2008; 2010b). 
 Nevertheless tort law can be a regulatory tool (Betlem 2005; Cane 2002; Pontin 1998; 
Schwartz 1994) and there is no doubt that the availability of individual tort rights can help the 
enforcement of the UCPD, particularly if public agencies are reluctant to enforce. Also, tort 
law can promote both corrective and distributive justice by encouraging or discouraging 
particular conduct in society (Arvind 2010:349-351; Dagan 2008:811-819; Gordley 2006). 
However, a full harmonisation system ought to indicate the boundaries of ancillary tort 
claims to prevent the existence of too much or too little rights in different Member States. 
This is particularly important for the UCPD because in the UK, for example, consumer 
litigation including recourse to other national laws seems more dominant than public 
enforcement. The CPUTR (Regulation 19) may have designated some public enforcement 
authorities for the UCPD
 
 (OFT 2008), but little enforcement, civil or criminal, is taking place 
(OFT 2009; Williams and Hare 2010, pp. 387, 396-397).  
      
Conclusion 
 
This paper demonstrates that the use of maximum directives for consumer protection may not 
resolve disparities in national laws if ambiguities and lack of clarity of concepts persist. The 
Commission’s claim that “the implementation of a directive may give rise to a single and 
coherent set of law at national level which would be simpler to apply and interpret by traders” 
(CEC 2008, p.8) is simply farfetched in the case of the UCPD.  Ferguson v British Gas which 
exploited the loosely formulated PHA to extend its harassment provisions to B2C cases 
highlights the contradictions in approaches of the PHA and UCPD and suggests loopholes in 
the latter’s full harmonisation goal.  The substantive liability thresholds and causal links, for 
example, are incompatible. Consequently, the amendment of the PHA to conform with the 
                                                          
55
 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2003] 3 All ER 932, para.30 (Hale LJ); Hunter v 
Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655 (HL); E (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 
633; O’Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1998] AC 188. 
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UCPD (Twigg-Flesner et al. 2005, pp.66, 85, 121) or an express statement in the PHA to 
exclude B2C unfair practices (Twigg-Flesner and Parry 2007, p.222) is required. 
 However, the bigger picture is the need for clarity in full harmonisation directives. 
Lack of clarity of concepts, definitions, liability, ancillary tort rights, and enforcement creates 
room for creative interpretations, intrusions by contradictory legislation and manipulation by 
parties. The review of the UCPD (Recital 24, Article 18) and the proposed Directive on 
Consumer Rights provide an opportunity to avoid loosely defined, open-ended and uncertain 
provisions. Another important step towards improving harmonisation is a one-stop legislation 
approach to transposition. As this account of harassment provisions shows, complete 
uniformity and certainty in B2C practices may well depend not on whether the UCPD is 
labelled a full harmonisation directive but on the clarity of its substantive and enforcement 
provisions and the ease of locating the national transposition.  
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